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Abstract: In this paper, the Extended Coupled Amplitude Delay Lock Loop (ECADLL) architecture,
previously introduced as a solution able to deal with a multipath environment, is revisited and
improved to tailor it to spoofing detection purposes. Exploiting a properly-defined decision algorithm,
the architecture is able to effectively detect a spoofer attack, as well as distinguish it from other kinds
of interference events. The new algorithm is used to classify them according to their characteristics.
We also introduce the use of a ratio metric detector in order to reduce the detection latency and the
computational load of the architecture.
Keywords: signal processing; GNSS receiver; spoofing detection; classification algorithm
1. Introduction
The increasing concern for security in all electronic and telecommunication systems has
affected many different sectors of today’s society, one of them being the Global Navigation Satellite
Systems (GNSS). Modern society strongly relies on GNSS, for a constantly increasing number of
applications and services. However, the issues related to the security of such systems is sometimes
underestimated. This is the case of some services relying on GNSS civil signals. In fact, the menace of
intentional radio-frequency interference, such as jamming or spoofing attacks, is gaining momentum,
and discussions are being held all over the world trying to find ways to protect GNSS civil users from
these attacks.
Nowadays, the effects of these intentional interferences, which are able to compromise the correct
working of the GNSS receivers, are well known [1–5], and the need for improving the security of the
receiver has been demonstrated [6,7], especially in the case of applications whose malfunctioning
would put people’s safety at risk. Not only navigation and transportation companies often rely
on the position obtained from the GNSS signals, but also power grids, telecommunications towers,
banking procedures, etc., use GNSS to synchronize many different processes [3].
There are different types of intentional interference [5,8] that affect the correct functioning of GNSS
receivers [3,5,9,10]. The most subtle and dangerous type of intentional interference is the spoofing
attack, which consists of the transmission of GNSS-like signals, aiming at taking control of the receiver.
If the spoofer takes control of the receiver, it is able to freely change its position and timing solutions
without the receiver noticing any unexpected effect [3,9]. Spoofing attacks have been demonstrated
on several occasions [6,11], and this has raised an alarm throughout the GNSS community. Different
kinds of implementations of the spoofing attacks will be presented in Section 2.
In order to design a countermeasure to spoofing attacks, this paper revisits and improves
a tracking technique known as Extended Coupled Amplitude Delay Lock Loop (ECADLL),
originally presented in [12,13]. The goal of the work is to tailor the architecture to spoofing detection,
making it also able to mitigate the effects created by spoofing attacks. Moreover, an effective algorithm
Sensors 2016, 16, 2051; doi:10.3390/s16122051 www.mdpi.com/journal/sensors
Sensors 2016, 16, 2051 2 of 22
for spoofer detection with the capability to distinguish between multipath and a spoofing attack
is defined. The ECADLL was tested against realistic spoofing scenarios, and the performance was
compared against another recently proposed anti-spoofing technique, known as the Signal Quality
Monitoring Technique (SQMT) [14]. With the introduction of a ratio metric detection algorithm in the
monitoring block, the detection latency was reduced, and the computational load of the algorithm
was decreased.
The ECADLL consists of a feedback tracking architecture that was proposed as a multipath
mitigation technique [12,13] able to remove multipath signals from the tracking channels. Given the
similar effects that spoofing signals and multipath signals have when observed in the correlation
domain, the ECADLL was later proposed as a spoofing detection technique [15,16]. However, a proper
detection algorithm was never been detailed and tested in realistic scenarios. In the present study,
we address these two unresolved aspects.
The paper is organized as follows: first, in Section 2, a review of the types of spoofing attacks
and a recall of the most common anti-spoofing techniques are presented. In Section 3, the theoretical
description of the working procedure of the ECADLL is revisited. Section 4 defines the spoofing
detection algorithm, and an analytic explanation on how to better exploit the information provided
by the ECADLL is provided. In Section 5, the experimental setup and the different scenarios used to
obtain the results are described. In Section 6, results using the ECADLL are shown, demonstrating the
spoofing detection capabilities of the algorithm and comparing them to another signal processing
anti-spoofing technique. Finally, in Section 7, the conclusions of the work are drawn.
2. Types of Spoofing Attacks and Countermeasures
In recent research, the different types of spoofing attacks have been classified based on how the
attack is constructed and on the difficulty of detecting it by a receiver point of view [9,17].
A simplistic spoofing attack is based on the use of a signal simulator to build the fake signal
and re-transmit it in order to fool the receiver. This type of attack is very simple to realize, but it is
also expensive and easily detectable by means of trivial techniques, given that a large signal power is
needed and that the fake signal is not synchronized with the constellation.
The second type is known as intermediate attacks or receiver-based spoofing attacks. This type
of spoofer has a built-in receiver that collects and tracks the satellite signal parameters, in order to
generate a new signal that is consistent with the current constellation [11] and transmits it to the
target receiver.
The third type of attack is called the sophisticated receiver-based spoofer. It aims to overcome
one weakness of the intermediate attack, which is that it only broadcast from a single antenna and
direction, thus the sophisticated version uses several different antennas to broadcast each satellite signal
in order to be undetectable through anti-spoofing techniques that rely on angle of arrival discrimination.
However, these attacks have a much higher complexity level than the previous two types, making
them very difficult to realize.
From the three types of spoofing attacks, the intermediate spoofer is the most feasible and probable
to cause damage, so is the one we will focus on throughout this article.
Since the first major publication reporting the feasibility of building a spoofer with a
software-defined receiver and low cost components [18], the GNSS community has been continuously
developing different anti-spoofing techniques, aimed at defending against the malicious signals at
different stages of the receiver. These anti-spoofing techniques have very different approaches, and
they can be classified into three main groups [3,9]:
(a) Cryptographic and authentication techniques: These methods propose to authenticate the incoming
signal, using signals from different receivers or frequencies (L1/L2). Alternatively, they exploit the
transmission of the P(Y)secured channel in order to identify if the received signal is authentic or
not [19–21].
Sensors 2016, 16, 2051 3 of 22
(b) Antenna-aided techniques: These techniques are based on the wide spatial correlation that
the satellite signal has with respect to the spoofer signal during an intermediate attack.
These techniques are vastly different, ranging from angle of arrival detection [22,23], to the
use of synthetic arrays [24] and beam forming techniques that are able to mitigate the attacks by
pointing null lobes at the spoofing signal [25,26].
(c) Receiver-level signal processing techniques: These methods are based on signal processing
techniques, which focus on aspects that differ between the spoofing signal and the satellite one.
Many different techniques have been proposed in this category, such as: techniques based
on signal power monitoring, either monitoring the carrier to noise ratio (C/N0) [27],
absolute in-channel power measurements [28] or relative power variations [29]. Other signal
processing techniques are based on the distribution analysis of the correlator output [30].
There exist also signal quality monitoring techniques, which aim at detecting distortions in
the correlation function via the use of ratio metric tests [31–35]. Other techniques are based on
the time of arrival and other consistency checks. Techniques based on goodness-of-fit tests have
been proposed [36] along with techniques based on Receiver Autonomous Integrity Monitoring
(RAIM) discrimination algorithms [29,37]. Finally, techniques based on the multiple Delay Lock
Loop (DLL) used for spoofing detection and mitigation [12,13,15,16] have been proposed.
This article focuses on ECADLL, which is a receiver-level signal processing anti-spoofing
technique based on a multiple-DLL architecture.
3. The ECADLL
The working principle of the ECADLL is based on distinguishing and tracking separately the
satellite signal and the impairment signal, i.e., spoofer or multipath. It uses an architecture made
of several DLLs and a feedback loop to remove the extra components from the incoming signal and
track each signal individually. The incoming satellite signal at the baseband level for a single satellite,
denoted as s(t) and under impairment presence denoted as m(t), can be written as:
s(t) = a0D(t− θ0)c f (t− τo)ej(2pi( f IF+ fD)t+θ0) + m(t) (1)
where,
m(t) = D(t− θ0 − θn)
M
∑
n=1
anc f (t− τ0 − τn)ej(2pi( f IF+ fD)t+θ0+θn) + n f (t) (2)
and:
• c f (t) is the spreading code of the signal
• τ0, a0 and θ0 are the satellite signal code delay, amplitude and carrier phase, respectively
• τn, an and θn denote the code delay, amplitude and carrier phase of the n-th impairment ray with
respect to the LOS
• f IF is the intermediate frequency of the front-end
• fD is the Doppler shift of the signal carrier
• D(t) is the navigation data information
• n f (t) is the Gaussian noise
In (1) and (2), we observe the overall signal that is used by the receiver after the intermediate
frequency down-conversion and the radio-frequency front-end filtering. The term (1) shows the signal
coming from the satellite, while (2) contains all possible impairment rays along with a model of the
noise of the signal.
Throughout this paper and in general for spoofing detection, M = 1 will be assumed, due to
the fact that only one powerful ray is assumed to be present during a spoofing attack. Given that the
spoofing signal has the same structure as the satellite signal, the ECADLL uses this intrinsic similarity
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to track each ray individually, using a special tracking structure referred to as the unit. Each unit
consists of a unique DLL, plus a couple of Amplitude Lock Loops (ALL), detailed in [12], that aim at
estimating the delay τn, the amplitude an and the phase θn of the different rays.
The input signal of the i-th unit will be:
si(t) = s(t)−
N
∑
n 6=i
aˆn · c(t− τˆn)ej(θˆn) (3)
where τˆn, aˆn and θˆn are the estimated values obtained from the tracking of Unitn.
From (3) and Figure 1, the working principle of the ECADLL can be understood. Using a feedback
loop, it subtracts from the overall received signal the sum of the estimated signals in other units.
In this way, the structure is able to separate the impairment component from the satellite signal and
track each one on a different units.
As can be observed in Figure 1, the total structure for one GNSS channel has a single Phase Lock
Loop (PLL), plus one unit for each additional signal that has to be tracked. In the case considered in
this work, the structure will have two units, one for the Line Of Sight (LOS) signal coming from the
satellite and the other to track the spoofing signal.
Figure 1. Extended Coupled Amplitude Delay Lock Loop (ECADLL) architecture for a single GNSS
channel and configured for spoofing detection.
Inside each unit, a DLL using a narrow correlator is used to estimate τˆn and uses the normalized
dot-product discriminator:
dτ =
ID · IP + QD ·QP
SP
(4)
where IP and QP are the prompt correlations of the in-phase and quadrature signals, respectively.
SP = I2P + Q
2
P and ID and QD are the early-minus-late of the I and Q channels.
Inside the ALL, the amplitude aˆn and phase θˆn are estimated as:
aˆn =
√
aˆ2n,i + aˆ
2
n,q θˆn = tan
−1(
aˆn,q
aˆn,i
) (5)
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where θˆn is the estimation of θ0 + θn. Amplitude values, aˆn,i and aˆn,q, are estimated using the in-phase
and quadrature results of the prompt correlation IP and QP, as:
aˆn,i =
IP
λ
(6)
aˆn,q =
QP
λ
(7)
where λ is a damping factor, slightly smaller than one, used to adjust the estimation accuracy.
The PLL structure in Figure 1 does not use the same correlation output as other units. It uses
the correlation values between the total incoming signal (s(t)) and the Unit0 local code (c(t − τ0)).
Thus, in the presence of impairments, the local carrier phase will not be completely aligned with the
carrier phase of the satellite signal. Nonetheless, the carrier phase error will be estimated by the couple
of ALLs inside each unit. Actually, recovering the relative phase shift for any single signal component
will be necessary, in order to produce the correct replica and add it to the feedback signal.
As an example, in Figure 2, the basic working procedure of the ECADLL algorithm is shown when
the spoofing and satellite signals are aligned in phase. On the left side of the picture, an estimated
correlation function of a generic received signal affected by spoofing is shown. On the right part,
we observe the results for the first iteration and for the iterations after the architecture reaches the steady
state. At the beginning of the tracking procedure, the architecture starts tracking the residual of the
operation s(t) − sˆ0 inside Unit1. At the following iteration, the feedback Switch B is closed, and after a
transition time, the two units’ estimations will be locked at values very close to the originals, such that
sˆ0 ≈ s0 and sˆ1 ≈ s1.
Figure 2. ECADLL basic working procedure when the satellite signal and the spoofing signal are
aligned in phase. On the left, the incoming signal is shown, and on the right, the solution after
N iterations. Only the in-phase channel is shown in this image for simplicity.
A monitoring block, shown in Figure 3, receives as inputs the estimations of τˆn, aˆn and θˆn, for all
of the units, and it is in charge of turning on and off each of them. We worked under the assumption
that a spoofing attack will happen after some time that the receiver is turned on, so the monitoring
block is in charge of deciding the moment when each unit is to be introduced by closing Switch A.
If the spoofer is not present, Unit1will be tracking noise, so its amplitude aˆ1 will be small, and
its delay τˆ1 will wander randomly. Once the spoofer signal appears on the satellite signal correlation
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space, Unit1 will quickly track the interference signal, thus increasing its value of amplitude and
locking the DLL around a value of τ1. At this moment, the monitoring block will close Switch B,
starting the feedback loop and obtaining a better estimation of the parameters.
The thresholds used by the monitoring block are defined based on the product of front-end
bandwidth (B) and the time of chip (Tc). The product B · Tc affects the shape of the correlation function,
rounding the peak of the correlation when the product is small. This effect causes a degradation on the
detection capabilities, for impairments that are close to the peak.
Figure 3. Monitoring block for ECADLL. It receives as inputs the estimations of delay, amplitude and
phase, and it controls the powering and insertion of units inside the loop.
Section 4 discusses the spoofing detection algorithm, which uses as inputs the estimations of each
unit, i.e., τˆn, aˆn and θˆn, and takes the decision of whether an impairment is present in the incoming
signal or not.
4. Using ECADLL Information for Spoofing Detection
The ECADLL architecture was originally proposed as a multipath mitigation technique. It is able
to eliminate the tracking errors under multipath scenarios for signals having a delay larger than≈50 ns
relative to the satellite signal [12]. The goal of this work is to study and propose a reliable detection
technique, able to recognize the spoofer’s presence. In Figure 4, a basic block diagram is presented,
where Di(tk) is the decision variable for the i-th channel at time tk. Its values are defined as:
Di(tk) =

2 Spoofer
1 Impairment
0 No impairment
(8)
Figure 4. Decision making block diagram.
It is important to notice that the information provided by the ECADLL architecture is
soft information on the estimation of the delay, amplitude and phase of the different signals
(aˆ0...aˆn, τˆ0...τˆn, θˆ0...θˆn). This information is combined to be used as an effective spoofing detection
method and has the potential to help with estimating the real user position under spoofing attacks.
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4.1. Detecting a Generic Impairment
The first thing the algorithm should focus on is detecting a generic impairment. Just by having
this information, the receiver is put into an alert stage, and it does not trust the channels that are
flagged as impaired.
In order to detect that an undefined impairment signal is present, either multipath or spoofing,
an initial decision can be made using the basic information of Unit1. If the DLL in Unit1 is locked,
thus having a low variance of τˆ1, and the relative amplitude aˆ1/aˆ0 is greater than a certain threshold
aˆth, the channel can be declared as impaired, and the error mitigation for multipath starts working.
Di(tk) = 1 if στˆ1 < σth and
aˆ1
aˆ0
> ath (9)
where στˆ1 is the variance of the estimated delay τˆ1 in a 1-s window. A window of 1-s duration was used,
as a tradeoff providing enough data points to have a good estimation of the variance στˆ1 , but keeping
the capability to make a decision at a good rate. Thresholds σth and ath are defined according to the
DLL bandwidth and the expected level of noise. In order to assess the threshold σth, we observed
the relationship between the variance of the DLL when tracking a simulated interference signal and
the variance when no additional signal was present. Using these values, we were able to obtain an
appropriate threshold for the specific configuration. For threshold ath, we empirically chose to flag any
signal with at least 10% of the Unit0 signal power, since any signal stronger than that is likely to be
an interference signal.
In Figure 5, we can observe how the top-most decision is the discrimination between classifying
the signal as impairment and no impairment. Summarizing, the channel will be flagged as impairment
if the tracking of Unit1 is considered locked to a signal.
Figure 5. Figure of the proposed ECADLL algorithm. The procedure is repeated for all of the satellites,
and it is able to classify the signal tracked by Unit1 as either impairment or spoofing.
4.2. Classification as Spoofer Presence
The generic impairment detection is the first step of the detection algorithm. Once it has been
classified as impairment, the goal is to recognize whether or not it can be labeled as a spoofing attack.
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In order to effectively declare the impairment as a spoofing signal, different aspects need to be taken
into account.
4.2.1. Detection of Negative Delays
A simple check that can be performed in order to decide whether or not a spoofer is present is to
observe if the relative delay is negative, such as:
δˆτ = τ1 − τ0 < 0 (10)
In this case, a spoofing attack can be declared safely assuming that the Unit0 is tracking a non-zero
level satellite signal. Given the physical nature of the multipath and assuming that the satellite signal
has a non-zero power level in the receiver, it is not possible for a multipath reflection to have a delay
smaller than the LOS signal, given that, by definition, the LOS is the minimum distance between the
receiver and satellite.
On the other hand, a spoofing signal could perfectly arrive into the receiver before the satellite
signals, thus giving away its presence. A spoofer could avoid this by managing its delay correctly,
but this simple check is a first hard detection to exclude these cases. Following this first discrimination,
the impairment will always be declared as a spoofer when (10) is true, and we can observe in Figure 5
how it is implemented as a second level of discrimination.
4.2.2. Detection by Using the Physical Laws of Propagation
One of the main differences between the spoofing signal and the multipath signal is that the latter
is bounded by the physical laws of propagation. Due to these physical limitations, it is not possible for
the multipath signal to increase its relative delay τˆ1, while maintaining the same amplitude aˆ1. This is
due to the fact that, in order to have a longer delay, the satellite signal needs to travel a longer physical
path, and as a result, its power level will decrease. This consideration means that a single multipath
signal will always have a smaller amplitude when the delay is larger. These bounds do not apply to
spoofing signals. This remark is also valid the other way around, where a closer delay is bounded to
have a greater amplitude.
A spoofing attack may be able to replicate the signal propagation behavior of the signal when it
attempts to align the spoofing signal with the satellite one. Nevertheless, when the spoofing signal
takes control of the receiver and the push-off phase starts, the satellite signal will be present in the
correlation domain, and it will be bound to the physical laws. The satellite signal in the correlation
domain will have the same amplitude regardless of the relative delay to the spoofer.
This can be defined for time tk and the i-th channel if:
if τ1(tk)− τ1(tk − dt) > ατ1(tk) (11)
and a1(tk)− a1(tk − dt) < βa1(tk) (12)
where dt is the time difference between the two measures. Coefficients α and β are smaller than one
and are defined using the expected propagation law. When the conditions (11) are met, the decision for
spoofing attack is made, i.e., Di(tk) = 2. In our case, we assumed a conservative linear decay, so both
α and β are defined as 10%, meaning that a 10% increment in delay will require at least a 10% decay
of the amplitude in order to not declare it as a spoofer. Once a channel is declared as being spoofed,
it will maintain its status as long as the DLL in Unit1 is locked. It is important to mention that these
statements hold as long as the units are tracking continuously the signal between times tk − dt and tk.
If for any reason the Unit1 loses track of the signal, then the check is not valid anymore.
In Figure 6, all of the different regions of the decision are graphically shown. Taking into
consideration these behaviors, we can distinguish between generic impairments and spoofing attacks.
It is important to notice that these remarks are assuming the spoofer will behave in a specific way,
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so if the spoofer does not follow these criteria, the receiver will be only able to label it as a generic
impairment and not a spoofing attack. Nonetheless, the assumptions presented above are common
during spoofing attacks, and in the cases where the spoofer is more harmful, it will likely fall into one
of the defined regions.
Figure 6. Impairment distinction based on soft observations. The signal in red is detected as a spoofing
attack because the delay difference τ1 − τ0 is negative. The green one is detected because the delay
increases, but the amplitude is maintained constant, and the yellow one is classified as impairment
because there is not enough information to allow discrimination.
4.2.3. Additional Remarks for Spoofing Classification
One additional remark that can be made is based on the knowledge of the dynamic behavior
of the receiver, e.g., checking for the continuity of the impairment signal over time if the user is in
a dynamic environment. In dynamic scenarios, multipath rays will be appearing and disappearing
as the physical scenario (objects, buildings) changes around the receiver. In these cases, having an
impairment signal that is persistent for several seconds is highly improbable, so a spoofing attack
could be declared.
On the other hand, in a static scenario where the receiver is fixed, this assumption does not hold
anymore, because a reflection from a nearby object can be persistent over time. Nonetheless, in a static
case, the receiver can be declared as spoofed once the error in the position, velocity or time surpasses
a certain value that a multipath signal will unlikely produce; this assumption only holds if the antenna
position is georeferenced. In static cases, it is also important to remember that multipath signals can be
observed and classified a priori if the receiver is in a known and fix environment, so anything that is
not the known signals can be also classified as spoofing. All of these considerations are heavily case
dependent, and that is why they were not included in the general classification algorithm; but they
could be effectively used to adapt the algorithm to a given scenario.
4.3. Improving Computational Load and Detection Latency
One drawback of the use of basic ECADLL is that when no additional signal is present, Unit1 of
each channel is continuously searching for it over random delays. This behavior creates additional
computational burden and may cause a delay in the estimation of the real characteristics of the
spoofing/multipath signal, because if the delay estimation is wandering randomly, it may take a longer
time for it to converge on the right delay once the additional signal is present. In order to improve this
situation, in our implementation, we control the turning on/off of the Unit1 detecting distortions on
the correlation function using a Ratio Metric (RM).
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It has been proven that the SQMT using RM works well detecting distortions in the correlation
function [14,33]. Unfortunately, these techniques are not able to estimate the delay of the spoofing
signal or mitigate the errors caused by these signals in the position and time solution. Using just one
RM to detect distortions in the correlation functions and as an additional input to the monitoring
block, the estimation and detection latency of the spoofing signal and the computational load can
be improved.
The RM is defined as:
M(tk) =
IE + IL
mIP
(13)
where IE, IL and IP are the early, late and prompt correlator outputs of the coherent DLL at a certain
time tk and m is the slope of the DLL discriminator. The monitoring block computes the mean value of
M during a 1-s time window, and if it surpasses a pre-defined threshold based on the probability of
false alarm, Unit1 is inserted in the feedback loop in order to detect the signal generating the distortion
as quickly as possible. A 1-s time window was again chosen as a trade-off to obtain a correct estimation
of the mean value and the time needed by the algorithm to make a decision. For spoofing detection,
a 1-s time window is still well below the time that a typical spoofing attack will need to gain control of
the receiver, which usually extends to several minutes [38].
In Figure 7, we can observe the impact on the detection latency when using the RM. When using
RM inside the monitoring block, the spoofing attack is detected as soon as the push-off phase starts,
around 120 s. Following this initial detection, the metric has some misdetection, and then, it recovers
and declares the spoofing attack for the duration of the test. Furthermore, in Figure 8, we can observe
that the delay estimation does not change and is less noisy during the time when the attack starts.
Having Unit1 turned off for the first 120 s will greatly help in the computational time for the scenario.
In Section 6.3, we provide numerical and analytic results for the improvement of the computational
load and the impairment detection latency.
Figure 7. Decision made for a spoofing attack scenario. In red is depicted the decision when no Ratio
Metric (RM) is used and in blue when using RMs inside the monitoring block.
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Figure 8. Delay estimation for a spoofing attack scenario. In red is depicted the decision when no RM
is used and in blue when using RMs inside the monitoring block.
5. Experimental Setup and Initial Results
In order to assess the capabilities of the ECADLL technique under spoofing attack, the Texas
Spoofing Test Battery (TEXBAT) was used [38]. The battery consists on a set of high-fidelity datasets that
include spoofing attacks in different configurations. The scenarios are based on two clean recordings,
free of impairments, one static and one dynamic. Different configurations for the type of attack, relative
power to the real signal and targeted variable, either time or position, are distributed between the
different scenarios. In Table 1, the basic description of the datasets and the nomenclature used for the
remainder of the paper can be found.
Table 1. Texas Spoofing Test Battery (TEXBAT) scenarios description.
Name Place Date Description
clean Austin, Texas January 2011 Base scenario for static datasets
ds3 Austin, Texas January 2011 Static matched-power time push
ds4 Austin, Texas January 2011 Static matched-power position push
ds6 Austin, Texas January 2011 Dynamic matched-power evolved position push
ds7 Austin, Texas June 2015 Static matched-power evolved time push
Results for TEXBAT ds3 are presented hereafter. This scenario is a static matched-power time push,
where the spoofer is inserted after 80 s aligned with the LOS signal, and the initial pull-off is done at
around 110 s.
It is important to notice that the results presented here were obtained transmitting the TEXBAT
dataset by cable connection to a GPS L1 front-end, named SIGE2 [39], and processing the results
using the ECADLL software receiver. By doing so, the signal was filtered through a front-end filter,
which has a 4-MHz bandwidth and a resolution of two bits. Furthermore, the sampling frequency
is around 16.3676 MHz, and the data were processed at an intermediate frequency of 4.1314 MHz.
This configuration provides a lower resolution than the original TEXBAT files, but gives a more
common front-end configuration similar to the ones found on commercial receivers.
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Results are presented for one of the channels, but similar behaviors are obtained for the others.
In Figure 9, the estimated C/N0 of Satellite 6 is presented. It can be observed that it has a similar trend
to the one shown in [38], but with a small loss of power, of a few dB, due to the different front-end
configuration and re-transmission.
Figure 9. C/N0 for Satellite 6 using TEXBAT ds3.
In Figure 10, the delay difference δτ = τ1 − τ0 is plotted. In this figure, the working of the
ECADLL can be observed: during the first 120 s, the estimated delay is zero, as Unit1 is still turned off.
When the asymmetry is revealed, after 120 s, it locks in to the signal that is separated from the spoofing
signal being tracked by Unit0. After 100 s of pull-off time, Unit1 estimates the correct delay difference
of the real signal as ≈2000 ns, which corresponds to the 600 m of error introduced by the spoofing
attack, as stated in [38].
Figure 10. Delay difference between Unit1 and Unit0 for TEXBAT ds3.
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In Figures 11 and 12, the estimated amplitudes aˆ0 and aˆ1 and the estimated phase differences θˆ0
and θˆ1 are presented for Unit0 on the top panel of each figure and Unit1 on the bottom one. For the
amplitude, we observe that the final values correspond to aˆ0 = 0.35 and aˆ1 = 0.28; the difference
between them is close to the 1.3 dB of spoofing advantage set for the matched-power scenario.
Observing these values, we know that Unit0 is tracking the spoofing signal, and Unit1 is tracking the
satellite signal.
In this case, given that the detection algorithm as shown in Figure 5 always assumes that the
spoofing signal is present in Unit1, the first stage of the detection would fail, but the second step will
detect the spoofing signal because the signal processed by Unit1 will not change its power while the
relative delay is changing. No matter in what stage of the algorithm the spoofing decision is made,
once Di(t) = 2, we can assume that the spoofing signal is the one with the higher power, because this
is needed to take control of the receiver. In such a case, in order to mitigate the effects of the spoofing
attack, information from the correct unit needs to be used for pseudorange computation, as shown in
Figure 4, as well as in the PLL of Figure 1, where Sˆb,0 should be adjusted accordingly.
For the spoofing detection, it can be seen that Unit1 starts following the signal that is being
pulled-off after it has a δτ of at least 300 ns, at around 150 s of the dataset. Having a small bandwidth
of the front-end will cause the detection to have a delay with respect to the time when the spoofer
actually starts modifying the position velocity and time (PVT)solution, due to the rounding effect in
the correlation function. Nevertheless, as demonstrated in [13], this latency can be improved using a
better product between front-end bandwidth and the time of chip (B · Tc).
These results show the ability of the ECADLL to detect and track the spoofing signal. It is
important to notice that given the many possible configurations of spoofing attack scenarios and
the many different parameters of the ECADLL architecture, making a statistical analysis in terms of
detection probability is a difficult task left for further investigation.
Figure 11. Amplitude estimation for Unit0 (top) and Unit1 (bottom) for TEXBAT ds3. In blue,
the in-phase amplitude estimation, and in red, the quadrature estimation are shown.
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Figure 12. Phase estimation for Unit0 (top) and Unit1 (bottom) for TEXBAT ds3.
6. Results Using the Spoofing Detection Algorithm
After observing the correct working of the ECADLL for the estimation of the signal parameters
using the TEXBAT dataset in Section 5, in this section, we present the results for the spoofing detection
algorithm, along with a comparison versus another technique. Numerical results highlighting the
detection capabilities and the improvement brought by the inclusion of RM are also presented.
6.1. Detecting an Evolved Static Matched-Power Time Push Attack
In this section, we present the results obtained processing scenario ds7, which, as explained in [40],
is a static matched-power evolved time push attack, based on the clean static dataset, where a spoofer
signal is injected after 110 s aligned in phase with the LOS signal. In the following 20 s, the spoofing
signal doubles its amplitude and modifies its phase by a 180 degree rotation. In this way, the spoofer
slowly takes control of the receiver without the need to synchronize to the navigation data bits [40].
The spoofing signal maintains its status for another 20 s, where it could perform a navigation data
bit attack. At 150 s, the spoofer starts the push off phase, increasing the code phase linearly at a rate
of 1.2 m per second and decreasing its amplitude until having a similar amplitude as the original
LOS signal.
In Figure 13, we observe how the ECADLL plus RM detector is able to detect the spoofing presence
around 120 s. After that, it loses the lock and recovers it once the signals are being pulled apart by the
spoofing attack.
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Figure 13. Decision of the spoofing detection algorithm for TEXBAT ds7.
In Figures 14 and 15, we observe the correct estimation of the delay difference δτ and the amplitude
estimation that follows the description presented in [40], and we observe how the relative difference
in amplitude decreases, as the spoofing signal pushes off the real signal and its modular amplitude
is reduced.
Figure 14. Delay difference estimation for satellite13, using TEXBAT ds7.
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Figure 15. Amplitude estimation for satellite 13, using TEXBAT ds7. In blue, the in-phase amplitude
estimation, and in red, the quadrature estimation are shown.
6.2. ECADLL vs. SQMT
In this section, we compare the performance of the ECADLL vs. an SQMT as presented in [14].
Figure 16 shows the decision made by SQMT and ECADLL using TEXBAT ds3. We observe that
ECADLL is able to detect the distortions at the same time as SQMT given the aid of the RM. ECADLL
loses track of the residual signal for some time (160–180 s), and during this time, it is not able to detect
the attack. We also observe how the region of detection of the SQMT is limited by the use of fixed
correlators, while once the ECADLL recovers the tracking on Unit1, it is able to detect the attack for
the duration of the test.
Figure 16. A comparison of the impairment detection using GPS Satellite Number 6 for the static
dataset, TEXBAT ds3. In red, the decision made by ECADLL is shown, and in blue, the one using the
Signal Quality Monitoring Technique (SQMT).
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In the case of a dynamic scenario, we used TEXBAT ds6, which is similar to ds3, but based on
a dynamic dataset recorded by means of a moving vehicle in Austin, TX, and spoofing the position
components of the receiver. The detection results, shown in Figure 17, demonstrate that ECADLL has a
similar behavior in both static and dynamic scenarios. After 150 s into the test, the architecture reaches
the steady state of the feedback and starts tracking the satellite signal on Unit1. The SQMT technique
is also able to detect the spoofing attack, but only for a limited duration of the attack, between 170 s
and 290 s, similar to what was observed in Figure 16. At around 50 s in Figure 17, we can observe that
a small impairment was detected, and we believe this to be a multipath signal present in the dynamic
scenarios of TEXBAT.
Figure 17. Comparison of the impairment detection using GPS Satellite Number 15 for the dynamic
dataset, TEXBAT ds6. In red, the decision made by ECADLL is shown and in blue, the one using SQMT.
Comparing the behavior of the two methods in Figures 16 and 17, we observe how ECADLL has
similar detection capabilities to the SQMT when the LOS and spoofing signal are close to each other.
The ECADLL is able to maintain the detection throughout the test, even when the two signals are well
separated, differently from SQMT.
6.3. Numerical Results for Detection and Latency
In this section, we provide numerical results for the ECADLL algorithm. These results were
obtained by processing four datasets with spoofing signals from the TEXBAT and three different clean
datasets, one from the clean scenario in the TEXBAT and the other two obtained by means of a moving
vehicle in downtown Turin, Italy. This is by no means a comprehensive set of datasets with all possible
configurations of spoofing signals, but we believe that they provide a very insightful initial result for
demonstrating the capabilities of ECADLL, the detection algorithm and its future potential.
First, we present a confusion matrix including all of the satellites for the different scenarios that
where tested and how they where classified by the algorithm. A confusion matrix is a useful tool to
describe the performance of a classification algorithm, such as the one proposed in this paper.
In Table 2, we can observe the confusion matrix and how the different satellites where classified.
For the spoofed scenarios, we observed six satellites for each of the four datasets, obtaining a possible
of 24 spoofed satellites; the ECADLL algorithm classified 22 of them correctly and missed the detection
of two, not detecting correctly one satellite in each of scenarios ds6 and ds7. We believe that these
misdetection where caused by the low C/N0 that these satellites had for this configuration of the
re-transmission, and the algorithm was not able to distinguish clearly the external signal that was
present in the correlation domain.
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On the other hand, no false alarms where present during the clean scenarios, and none of the
satellites were wrongly classified.
Table 2. Confusion matrix for the two types of datasets processed.
Predicted Outcome
True
Spoofed Impairment Clean
Spoofed satellite 22 0 2
Clean Scenario 0 0 18
Following the confusion matrix, which summarizes the detection capabilities of the technique,
we will now focus on the improvements that the introduction of RM brought to ECADLL. Two main
features where affected by RM, and they will be defined as Computational Time (CT) and Detection
Latency (DL). CT will be defined as the time that the algorithm takes to process a single satellite of
one scenario of the TEXBAT datasets, and DL is the time difference between the beginning of the
push-off phase of the spoofing signal and the first detection of the algorithm, either as an impairment
or spoofer. Of course, these values will change between configurations of the receiver and of the
spoofing, computer implementation and characteristics of the datasets. Therefore, they should not be
considered as standalone values, but we can obtain useful information if we compare the same dataset
while ECADLL is using RM or not. In Table 3, we can observe the numerical improvement for each of
the different datasets.
Table 3. Numerical results for improvement of detection delay and computational load. Legend:
DL = Detection Latency. CT = Computational Time. DLI = Detection Delay Improvement.
CTI = Computational Time Improvement.
Base ECADLL ECADLL w\RM Improvement
DLbase (s) CTbase (min) DLRM (s) CTRM (min) DLI (%) CTI (%)
clean - 35 - 21 - 40
ds3 27 38 17 35 37 7.9
ds6 33 36 17 33 48.5 8.3
ds7 26 41 80 33 57.5 19.5
ds4 93 38 98 30 5.1 21
In the Computational Time Improvement (CTI), defined as CTI = (CTbase − CTRM)/CTbase,
we can see how the biggest improvement was obtained when the clean dynamic scenario was used;
this means when no spoofer was present. This result is intuitive because when no spoofer is present,
the use of RM for the activation of the secondary units will prevent ECADLL from having the two units
active at all times. The presence of the Unit1 by itself represents a high burden on the computational
load of the receiver, given that it can be comparable to having twice as many channels in tracking and,
thus, twice as many correlators.
The scenarios with the presence of spoofing signals do not get that much improvement, because
while the spoofer signal is present, both configurations are running two units for each channel.
This means that the improvement will be weighted by the amount of time the spoofing signals are not
present in the dataset, which for ds3 and ds6 is about 1/4 and for ds7 and ds4 is around 1/3 of the
total time.
Eventually, we focus our attention on the Detection Latency Improvement (DLI), defined as
DLI = (DLRM − DLbase)/DLbase. The latency reported here is assuming that the spoofer starts
modifying its delay at the time of 110 s of each dataset as reported in [38]. For scenarios ds4 and ds6,
which are modifying the position according to their selected pattern, each satellite will be modified
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with a different delay, unknown to us. According to our analysis, the modification of the delay for ds6
occurs closer to the 110 s than the modification for ds4.
It is interesting to notice the significant improvement in latency obtained when considering ds7.
Given the slower rate at which the spoofer modifies the delay with respect to the other scenarios,
we get a longer detection time when only relying on the tracking lock of Unit1. When using the ratio
metrics, we see that we have a much lower latency, and we are able to flag the presence of impairments
in a quicker way.
Values in Table 3 give us the numerical results on how the architecture performance was improved
by the introduction of the RM as a simple additional tool for the monitoring block. It is also important to
notice that the detection latency is not necessarily referring to a spoofer classification by the algorithm,
but it represents the initial warning that the RM gives to the receiver for it to not trust the signal coming
from that satellite, until it can be correctly classified or corrected by means of ECADLL.
7. Conclusions
In this paper, a spoofing detection algorithm based on the use of ECADLL was introduced.
The algorithm is able to identify spoofing attacks when different conditions are met, based on the
expected behavior of multipath reflections and on the dynamics of the receiver.
The ECADLL architecture along with the spoofing detection algorithm were tested against the
TEXBAT datasets, demonstrating that the technique is able to detect the spoofing attack scenario
under certain conditions and that it is able to provide accurate estimation of the parameters of the
spoofing signal. The detection algorithm presented in this work works on a single satellite observation.
Looking at more satellites simultaneously, using a parallel architecture, can improve the decisions and
help identify more easily the spoofing attack.
The ECADLL version presented in the paper, including the spoofing detection algorithm and the
ratio metrics in the monitoring block, has overall good detection capabilities and low false alarms,
while improving over the original ECADLL in the computational burden and on the detection latency.
On the other hand, a careful definition of the thresholds for the ratio metric is important, in order to
turn on the units when it is needed and obtain optimal performances.
By only containing two units for each tracked channel, the presented version of the algorithm is
only able to provide protection against one spoofing signal at a time. The presence of more than one
spoofer competing to gain control of the receiver is quite unrealistic, but other units could be added to
the architecture without major modifications, as was presented in [13].
It is important to notice that the anti-spoofing method proposed here is not able to defend the
receiver in the cases of overpower attacks, where the vestigial receiver signal is buried under the noise
levels introduced by the spoofer. Fortunately, these types of attacks are easily detectable by using
in-band power measurements, given that increments of more than a few dBs in the overall power are
suspicious and can be a priori excluded.
Solutions for reducing and mitigating the effects of the spoofing attacks in the receiver remain to
be explored. This feature could be achieved by switching the navigation solution algorithm to get its
ranging information from the unit tracking the satellite signal on a channel under spoofing influence.
In order to do this, a powerful and trusted detection algorithm, as the one presented during this work,
is a good initial step.
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